(自由贸易区观察研究系列随笔）

一批追寻知识产权正义的学者正在国际上向关注人权、知识产权、贸易和发展的法律和其他领域的学者征集签名，以支持给予世界贸易组织(WTO)中最不发达国家成员(LDCs)一个宽限期，以免除这些成员国必须遵循TRIPS协定相关要求的义务。世界贸易组织中的最不发达成员国最初被赋予了到2006年截止的对于除国民待遇和最惠国待遇之外的所有TRIPS协议中所要求（履行的义务）宽限期。这一宽限期后来又于2005年被延长至2013年6月30日（关于药品问题的延长期则单独列为截止到2016年）。但却又设置了缺少最起码的合理期限的条件限制，诸如要求最不发达国家必须确保当前的知识产权保护水平，而这一要求连TRIPS协定第66条1款都没有做出规定。目前最不发达国家成员国所要求的是一个无条件的宽限期，只要他们还是最不发达国家。他们希望降低接受不必要的知识产权标准将能够使得最不发达国家建立起他们的技术基础，并提升有限的国内（创新生产）能力。最不发达国家的这一要求目前得到了350个民间组织，一些产业组织，数个多边机构和许多发展中国家WTO成员国的支持。

我们还在征集本信的签名（见下），面向那些除了那些关注药物可及性，也关注知识产权对于最不发达国家冲击（如信息获得，尤其是IT，教育和科学资源），农业资源，绿色和气候控/减技术，以及更广泛的发展问题的学者群体。我们目前已经征集到30个签名，其中包括数位领军级的国际知识产权和贸易专家。

兹事体大，状甚急，美欧正提升对于最不发达国家的压力，试图短期的且高度附条件的宽限期，TRIPS理事会也召开在即。我们征集签名将至4月26日，请发邮件至美国东北大学法学院教授Brook K. Baker ： b.baker@neu.edu

致WTO成员国：

我们是来自高，中，低收入国家的法律和相关领域学者，致力于国际知识产权和贸易法，发展研究，人权和其他相关领域的专业研究。我们特写信明确支持最不发达国家提出的关于无条件延长遵守WTO的TRIPS协定宽限期的要求，依照最不发达国家的代表海地所提出的经过适当动员的要求，对于任何特定国家之宽限期，只要该国仍然为最不发达国家，就应该延长下去。除了要遵循国民待遇和最惠国待遇的要求，最不发达成员国将保有决定是否修订法律以变更或者修改现存知识产权立法的自由。我们对于这一要求的支持，是建立在历史和TRIPS协定第66条1款语义的基础之上，以及最不发达国家应保有相应政策空间的需要，如果他们要发展自身技术基础是，这些知识产权保障的修订，将可能会帮助而不是伤害他们的发展进程。特别要指出的是，我们的专业分析立足于以下基础：

（1）、第66条1款在WTO内有共同认可理解的明示前提，那就是最不发达成员国需要有弹性“去创立一个可行的技术基础”，而且他们还有额外的“与他们自身的经济，金融和行政约束”相关的“特殊需要和要求”。这一共识在TRIPS协定前言当中也得到体现。

（2）这一对于第66条1款的共识，渐次反映了这样一种认识，即最不发达成员国过早接受符合TRIPS要求的知识产权保护标准，会阻碍他们建立一个有效地技术基础，以及其他所需要的能力，或者两者居其一；至少，这些国家需要预留政策空间，以就此做出自己的决策。现有的经验证据并不支持这样一种论断，即突出知识产权保护对于吸引外国直接投资，提升本地创新力，技术能力建设或者最不发达国家内更广泛的发展议题有正面作用。

（3）第66条1款清楚地允许最不发达成员国废除任何知识产权立法，这些立法可以使他们在接受TRIPS协定前就制定的，或者甚至是在最初的最不发达国家宽限期内制定的。

（4）依照第66条1款的规定，WTO成员表达了对于最不发达国家成员国来说，他们需要一个相当长时间去发展自身的技术和其他能力，因而最初的10年宽限期———至2006年———太短了，于是就允许做一次或者多次的进一步的期限“延展”；

（5）经验表明，很少有国家自1991年以来脱离（所谓毕业）最不发达国家的身份（只有博茨瓦纳，佛得角和马尔代夫），而那些所谓“毕业”的国家，也只是主要表现在GDP增长而不是技术进步本身。坦率的讲，还有一些国家在”毕业“的门槛上，但众多最不发达国家还没有达到“毕业”的标准。

（6）第66条1款的经验同时表明，一系列的有限的转型期和宽限期，诸如头十年的转型期以及在2005年又获得的六年半的宽限期，对于数量众多的最不发达国家的技术转型和能力建设来说，都是不足够的，尤其是在发达国家没有能够切实履行第66条2款规定的技术转让的义务的情况下。这样，一个长得多的宽限期就成为必须，以使得宽限期内最不发达国家能够将注意力完全集中于发展诸目标。而WTO的先例也已经支持只要成员国是最不发达国家，就可以持续保持宽限期。

（7）对于最不发达成员国的技术支持，迄今依然受到错误的建议，而过度集中于依据TRIPS第67条之规定进行提升遵守TRIPS相关规定的能力建设，而不是依据第66条的规定，集中在促进发展的能力建设和技术展让方面，这就分散了最不发达成员国和他们的发展伙伴的注意力。这样，在当前将给予最不发达国家宽限期附加上该国需要报告对于TRIPS协定遵守状况的优先需要的要求，是不妥当的。

（8）最不发达国家过早地接受符合TRIPS规定的知识产权体系将会对于他们履行关于提供基本公共产品的人权义务，诸如药物、教育和科学资源、食品安全、以及环境保护技术、能源节约、气候控/减等等，产生负面的影响。在关键商品和资源方面的知识产权保护将导致超价格竞争，从而导致最不发达国家和他们的国民无法负担这些商品或资源。

（9）依据第66条1款，TRIPS理事会根据正当动员的要求，“应该…使宽限期一致化”，这意味着宽限期是强制性的———是一种权利——而不是一种可以讨价还价、可以被发达国家成员压低的“东西”。这些宽限期将由TRIPS理事会所授予，这样在WTO在2013年12月于巴厘岛举行一般性会议之前，不应该被推迟。

（10）接受宽限期对一些最不发达国家成员国如果想接受某种形式的知识产权，比如使用商标模式，或者在其他一些领域里介绍进一些有限的权利等等，并不构成障碍。换句话说，这样的变化（接受某种形式的知识产权）将成为一种可能，但不是必须的（不是一种强制要求）。

我们认为，所有的试图稀释最不发达国家要求都是非正义的，并与第66条1款的语义和精神相违背。另一方面，我们注意到包括联合国发展规划署、联合国艾滋病规划署、艾滋病与法律全球委员会（300个民间组织的联合体）等在内的许多组织都已经表达了对于最不发达国家成员国的支持。

总而言之，我们重申我们对于最不发达国家要求宽限期的无条件的支持，只要他们还保留着最不发达国家的身份。我们确信，这一要求在TRIPS第66条1款规定下，是完全正当的，任何反对这一要求的努力和争辩也是没有事实依据的。

（贾平翻译，注释见英文原稿）

Several of IP justice academics are soliciting signatures from legal and other academics around the world who focus on human rights, intellectual property, trade, and development and who are in favor of the request by WTO least developed country Members that they be granted an extension of the time period within which they must become compliant with the TRIPS Agreement.  WTO LDC Members were initially given an extension with respect to all TRIPS requirements except national and most favored nation treatment until 2006.  That transition period was further extended until June 30, 2013 in 2005 (a separate extension was granted on pharmaceutical products only until 2016) but with some unfortunate conditions (beyond the unreasonably short term), such as a requirement that LDCs must keep their current level of IP protections, something that was not required by TRIPS Article 66.1.  The current request from LDC Members is for an unconditional extension of the transition period so long as an LDC Member is an LDC.  It is hoped that a longer and unconditional extension permitting rollback of improvidently adopted IP standards will allow LDCs to build their technological base and improve limiting domestic capacities.  This request has received support from 350 civil society organizations, from some industry groups, from several multilateral organizations, and from many developing country members of the WTO.

We are seeking signatures to the letter appended below beyond those who focus primarily on access to medicine, to academics who are also concerned about IP impacts in LDCs on access to information (especially IT, educational, and scientific resources), agricultural resources, green and climate control/mitigation technologies, and development more generally.  We already have 30 signers, including several leading international IP and trade experts.

There is some urgency since the US and EU are ramping up their pressure on LDCs to impose a short and highly conditionalized extension and the final TRIPS Council meeting will happen soon.  Therefore, we will be collecting signatures until April 26.  Please send your sign-ons to me:  b.baker@neu.edu

Legal Academics’ Expert Letter on LDCs’ TRIPS Extension Request

To WTO Members:

We are legal and other academics from high-, middle-, and low-income countries who specialize in international intellectual property and trade law, development studies, human rights, and other disciplines.  We are writing in unequivocal support of the extension requested by Least Developed Country Members of the World Trade Organization (LDC Members) for an unconditional extension of the time period within which LDC Members must become compliant with the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Pursuant to the properly motivated requested from Haiti on behalf of LDC Members, the extension for any particular country could last as long as that country was still an LDC.[1] LDC Members would retain freedom to amend national legislation to change or modify any existing intellectual property legislation subject only to compliance with national treatment and most favoured nation treatment requirements.

Our support for the requested extension is grounded on both the history and language of Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement[2] and on the need of LDC Members to retain policy space if they are to develop their technological base such that intellectual property protections might be helpful rather than harmful to their development processes.  In particular, our expert analysis is grounded on the following:

(1) Article 66.1 was explicitly premised on a collective understanding at the WTO that LDC Members needed flexibility “to create a viable technological base” and that they had additional “special needs and requirements” with respect to “their economic, financial and administrative constraints”.   This understanding was also fully captured in the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement.[3]

 (2) This Article 66.1 consensus in turn reflected an understanding that the premature adoption of TRIPS-compliant intellectual property protections by LDC Members could impede the development of a viable technological base and other needed capacities or alternatively, at the very least, that countries needed to retain policy space to make their own decisions in this regard. Existing empirical evidence does not support the proposition that heightened intellectual property protections have had positive impacts on foreign direct investment, local innovation, technological capacity-building, or even development more broadly in LDCs.[4]

(3) Article 66.1 expressly permitted LDC Members to dismantle any intellectual property legislation that they had enacted prior to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement or even during the original LDC transition period. This same right should have been granted in any further extensions thereof, meaning that the paragraph 5 stay-put provision in the 2005 extension[5] was improvidently granted and it should not be incorporated into the 2013 extension.[6]

 (4) Pursuant to Article 66.1, WTO Members expressed an understanding that LDC Members needed a significant time period during which to develop their technological and other capacities and that the initial ten-year transition period – until 2006 – might be too short, thus directly allowing for one or more further “extensions” thereof.

(5) Experience has shown that very few LDCs have been able to graduate from LDC status since 1991 (only Botswana, Cape Verde, and the Maldives) and that those that have graduated have done so primarily on the basis of improved GDP rather than technological development per se.   Admittedly, several other countries are on the threshold of graduation,[7] but many LDC Members have not even approached eligibility for graduation.

(6) Experience under Article 66.1 also shows that a series of time-limited transition periods and extensions, such as the initial ten-year transition period and the six and a half year extension granted in 2005, has been insufficient for technological transformation and capacity building for the vast majority of LDC Members, especially in light of developed countries having failed to facilitate meaningful technology transfer as required by Article 66.2.[8]  Thus, a much longer extension is needed during which LDC Members can devote their entire attention to development objectives.  There is WTO precedent for extensions that last as long as a Member is an LDC.[9]

 (7) Technical assistance for LDC Members to date has ill-advisedly focused on capacity building for TRIPS-compliance pursuant to Article 67[10] rather than on capacity building and technology transfer for development pursuant to Article 66, diverting the attention of both LDC Members and their development partners.  Thus, it would be inappropriate to include requirements with respect to reporting priority needs for TRIPS compliance in the current LDC extension request.[11]

 (8) Premature adoption of TRIPS-compliant intellectual property regimes in LDC Members will adversely affect their ability to fulfill human rights obligations with respect to the provision of essential public goods including medicines, educational and scientific resources, food security, and technologies for environmental protection, energy conservation, and climate control/mitigation.  Intellectual property protections on key commodities and resources can lead to supra-competitive pricing and thus to unaffordability for LDCs Members and their citizens.

(9) Pursuant to Article 66.1, the TRIPS Council “shall … accord extensions” upon duly motivated requests, meaning that extensions are mandatory – a matter of right – rather than something that can be negotiated downward by developed country members.  Such extensions are to be granted by the TRIPS Council and therefore should not be postponed until the WTO general meeting in Bali in December of 2013.

(10) The adoption of the extension would not impede efforts of some LDC Members, if desired, to adopt certain forms of intellectual property, e.g., utility models or trademarks, or to experiment with early introduction of limited rights in other areas.  In other words, such differentiation will certainly be a possibility but not a requirement.

There have been reports that certain developed country Members, particularly the U.S. and E.U., are putting pressure on LDC Members and their allies to water-down their extension request and to accept a much shorter timeframe (as little as five years); a stay-put provision locking in existing levels of intellectual property protection; differential approaches for different intellectual property rights, i.e. patents and trademarks; and/or differential treatment for different LDC Members.

已经有报告指出，一些发达国家成员，尤其是美国和欧盟，正在向最不发达国家及其盟友们施加压力，以稀释他们对于宽限期的要求，并接受一个更短期的时间（比如五年）；加入一个隐蔽条款，以锁定在现存层面的知识产权保护中；对不同的知识产权（比如对于专利和商标权）采取区别对待措施；对于最不发达国家成员国采取分而治之的区别对待等等。

In our opinion, all of these downward demands are unjustified and contrary to the language and spirit of Article 66.1.  On the other hand, we note that many organizations have expressed support for the LDC extension request, including UNDP and UNAIDS,[12] the Global Commission on HIV and the Law,[13] a consortium of 300 civil society organizations,[14] developing country Members,[15] and others.[16]

In conclusion, we repeat our unreserved support for the requested extension of the transition period for LDC Members to implement TRIPS so long as they remain an LDC and our conviction that this request is fully justified under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and that arguments and efforts opposing it are unfounded.

[1] “Least developed country Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of the Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, until they cease to be a least developed country Member.” Request for an Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1, IP/C/W/583 (November 5, 2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_1_ipcw583_e.pdf.

[2] “In view of the special needs and requirements of least-developed country Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such Members shall not be required to apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of Article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord extensions of this period.”  (Emphases added.)

[3] This understanding of LDC Members need for flexibility is also reflected in the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement:  “Members … Recognizing also the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base … agree.”

[4] See e.g. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy Report, 40(London, 2002) (finding that the considerable literature linking IP and development that exists is largely speculative, tentative, and questionable given limitations on data and methodology and concluding that there is a lack of evidence finding that FDI is positively related to IP protection in developing countries); accord K.E. Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economy of Intellectual Property in the 21^st Century, 63 (Washington:  Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012) (noting “[s]pecifically, there is scare evidence that stronger IPRs encourage more access by the poorest and smallest countries to global technologies” and that “there is no clear universal relationship between policy reforms that strengthen IPRs and subsequent innovation or R&D investments”); see also P.G. Sampath and P. Roffe, Unpacking the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond (Geneva:  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2012) (reporting no direct evidence of IPR protection on promotion of technology transfer in developing countries); K. Briggs, Does Patent Harmonization impact the decision of volume of high technology trade?, 25 Int’l Rev. Econ. & Fin. 35-51 (2012) (finding that studies reach difference conclusions about the impact of patent rights on growth in different income group countries and that her own study finds that patent reform and harmonization in low income countries plays a minor role at best in terms of facilitating technology transfer through trade); Albert G.Z. Hu & I.P.L. Png, Patent Rights and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panels of Manufacturing Industries, 1 (2010) (“[T]here is scant empirical evidence to validate the basic premise that IP rights have fostered or do foster invention and creative work, still less economic growth”), availableat http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_econ_ge_5_10/wipo_ip_econ_ge_5_10_ref_huandpng.pdf.

[5] “Least-developed country Members will ensure that any changes in their laws, regulations and practice made during the additional transitional period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.”  Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, Decision of the TRIPS Council 29 November 2005, IP/C/40.

[6] Article 66 has no requirement whatsoever that LDC Members maintain any existing level of intellectual property protection.  LDC Members were thus free to dismantle intellectual property regimes imposed during colonial rule or thereafter adopted.  If they did adopt or maintain any intellectual property protections, their only substantive requirements under TRIPS were to provide national and most favoured nation treatments.  In contrast, non-LDC Members were given variable transition periods under Article 65 of TRIPS depending on whether they had previously declined to provide patent protections on products in a particular field of technology (commonly pharmaceuticals and agricultural products), whether they were transitioning from a planned economy or not.  In such cases, however, Article 65(5) required maintenance of existing levels of IP protection during the transition period: “A Member availing itself of a transitional period under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 shall ensure that any changes in its laws, regulations and practice made during that period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency with the provisions of this Agreement.”  Accordingly, even though a stay-put provision was improvidently requested and adopted in the 2005 extension, no such provision should be requested or adopted in the current extension.

[7] Equatorial Guinea, Samoa, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

[8] “Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.”  See Suerie Moon, Meaningful Technology Transfer to the LDCs: A Proposal for a Monitoring Mechanism for TRIPS Article 66.2, ICTSD Policy Brief No. 9 (2011).

[9] Article 15.2 (Special and Differential Treatment) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture states: “Developing country Members shall have the flexibility to implement reduction commitments over a period of up to 10 years.  Least-developed country Members shall not be required to undertake reduction commitments.”

[10] “In order to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement, developed country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training of personnel.”  For a report representing this erroneous focus, see SAANA Consulting, Approach Paper – Assessing LDC Progress in the Implementation of the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Draft Report Oct. 2011), available at a link at http://keionline.org/node/1572.

[11] This was another “mistake” in the 2005 extension, where in paragraph 2, LDC Members were asked to provide the TRIPS Council with as much information as possible on their priority needs for technical and financial assistance with the primarily to help them take the necessary steps to implement the TRIPS Agreement.  Developed countries were then asked in paragraph 3 to provide technical and financial help to least developed countries to address the identified needs effectively.

[12] Issue Brief: TRIPS transition period extensions for least-developed countries (2013), available athttp://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2013/JC2474_TRIPS-transition-period-extensions_en.pdf;

[13] Recommendation 6.4. “The WTO members must indefinitely extend the exemption for LDCs from the application of TRIPS provisions in the case of pharmaceutical products. The UN and its member states must mobilise adequate resources to support LDCs to retain this policy latitude.” Risks, Rights & Health (2012), available at http://www.hivlawcommission.org/resources/report/FinalReport-Risks,Rights&Health-EN.pdf.

[14] See http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/CSO-Letter-Supporting-Extension-of-LDCs-Transition-Period.pdf.

[15] Catherine Saez, “WTO:  Wide Support for LDC TRIPS Extension, With A Hitch”, IP-Watch (March 6, 2013), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/06/wto-wide-support-for-ldc-trips-transition-extension-with-a-hitch/.

[16] See e.g. Computer & Communications Industry Association, “CCIA Endorses TRIPS Deferral Request for Least Developed Countries” (March 4, 2013), available at http://www.ccianet.org/index.asp?sid=5&artid=363&evtflg=False.